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Abstract 
This paper explores theoretically and empirically potentially important yet often-neglected 
linkage between task coordination within the organization and the structure of organization and 
bundling of HRMPs (Human Resource Management Practices). In so doing, we also provide 
fresh insights on the interplay between the firm’s technological and output market characteristics 
and its choice of HRMP system. We begin with constructing a team-theoretic model and derive 
three task coordination modes: vertical control, horizontal coordination, and hybrid coordination. 
The model provides rich implications about complementarity involving task coordination modes, 
HRMPs, training and hiring, and management strategies, and illustrates how such 
complementarity is affected by the firm’s technological and output market conditions. Guided by 
the theoretical exploration, we analyze unique data from a new survey of Japanese firms which 
provide for the first time data on newer forms of HRMPs adopted by Japanese firms (such as 
cross-functional offline teams and self-managed online teams). One novel finding (which is 
consistent with the theory) is that the adoption of both self-managed online teams and 
cross-functional offline teams usually arises in firms with shop-floor committees while the 
introduction of cross-functional offline teams alone often takes place in firms with joint 
labor-management committees. We also confirm implications from our theory that firms in more 
competitive markets are more likely to adopt both types of teams while firms facing more erratic 
price movement tend not to adopt self-managed online teams (JEL: M5, L2, J53, D2) 
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Market Characteristics, Intra-Firm Coordination, and the Choice of Human 
Resource Management Systems: Evidence from New Japanese Data 
 
I. Introduction 
Much of the literature on innovative HRMPs (Human Resource Management Practices) 
focus on their effects on enterprise performance. They generally find that HRM systems with 
complementary practices such as teams, joint labor-management committees, and incentive pay 
raise productivity or other firm performance measures.1  
However, a relatively fewer attempts have been made to identify under what 
circumstances firms adopt these new practices and how they select a particular combination of 
HRMPs. Earlier works such as Osterman (1994) use nationally representative samples of U.S. 
establishments encompassing diverse industries and study general patterns of the adoption and 
diffusion of innovative work practices. More recent works tend to focus on specific industries in 
the U.S. and examine the adoption of various complementary work practices in more detail (see 
for example Pil and MacDuffie, 1996 on automobile plants and Boning, Ichniowski and Shaw, 
2005 on mini-mills).2    
Evidence on the incidence of new innovative work practices is even more limited 
outside of the U.S. Thus, Jones and Kato (1993) find for publicly traded firms in Japan that firms 
were more likely to adopt employee stock ownership plans when recent business performance 
was below average, the capital/labor ratio was relatively low, and employment growth was 
relatively fast. The results are consistent with the following explanations: (1) employees’ 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997), Freeman, Kleiner, and Ostroff (2000), 
Cappelli and Neumark (2001), Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan (2003), Boning, Ichniowski , and Shaw (2005), 
Black and Lynch (2001, 2004), Bartel (2004), for the U.S.; Jones and Kato (1995) and Kato and Morishima 
(2002) for Japan; Leoni, et. al. (2001) for Italy; Addison and Belfield (2000); Conyon and Freeman (2001); 
and DeVaro (2006) for the U.K.; Eriksson (2003) for Denmark; Bayo-Moriones, et. al. (2003) for Spain; and 
Zwick (2004) for Germany. 
2 One notable exception is a new NBER working paper which uses a representative sample of U.S. 
establishments including both manufacturing and non-manufacturing (Lynch, 2007).  
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incentives to monitor and impose peer pressure on each other should be stronger when they face 
risks of bankruptcy, wage reduction or layoffs in poor business environment; (2) group 
incentives are less likely to be effective in highly automated production systems; and (3) the 
interests of employees in growing organizations are more aligned with those of shareholders and 
management and thus more of them are likely to participate in the ESOP. For Europe, Poutsma, 
Hendrickx, and Huijgen (2003) use a survey of firms in ten EU members and stress the 
importance of country specific factors as a determinant of the adoption and diffusion of 
participatory employment systems. However, the focus of previous works tends to be narrow 
with insufficient attention to the relationship between business or market environments and the 
design of HR system as a whole.   
By reviewing the literature on the adoption of HRMPs, we are struck by the relative 
absence of coherent theory on the firm’s choice of HRMPs. In particular the literature is often 
silent on potentially important interplay between modes of task coordination within the 
organization and the structure of organization and bundling of HRMPs. Moreover, as the 
contingency theory in organizational behavior developed in the 1960s stress, the firm’s 
technological and output market conditions may play a crucial role in determining the firm’s 
choice of a specific mode of task coordination within the organization and hence its selection of 
a specific HRM system (provided there is a important link between task coordination modes and 
HRM systems).3  
                                                 
3 The literature of contingency theory in organizational behavior published in the 1960s attempted to 
make a connection between the varying technical and economic conditions outside the organizations and the 
pattern of organization and administrative architecture that exhibit successful performance. Early works 
generally found that when the environment and task of the organization were certain and predictable then 
centralization and formalization were appropriate, but when they were uncertain and unpredictable then 
decentralization and lack of formalization were required. For example, Burns and Stalker (1961) concluded 
from their research with 20 English manufacturers that the more rapidly the firms’ technological and market 
environments were changing, the more flexible or “organic” their structures tended to be.  Essentially similar 
conclusions were reached by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) in their study of 12 large American firms.  
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This paper begins with constructing a coherent team-theoretic model by building on the 
works by Dessein and Santos (2006) and Aoki (1986), and derives three distinct modes of task 
coordination within the organization: vertical control, horizontal coordination, and hybrid 
coordination.4 The model is then used to generate rich implications about complementarity 
involving task coordination modes, HRMPs, training and hiring, and management strategies, and 
illustrate how such complementarity is affected by the firm’s technological and output market 
conditions. Guided by the theoretical exploration, we analyze unique data from a new survey of 
Japanese firms which provide for the first time data on newer forms of HRMPs adopted by 
Japanese firms (such as cross-functional offline teams and self-managed online teams). One 
                                                                                                                                                             
Subsequent studies in the contingency theory, however, seem to have lost their interests in the role of 
purely economic and market conditions in shaping the structure and management system of the organization. 
They primarily focused on the relationships between the process technology adopted within the organization 
and its structure (Woodward 1965, Hickson et al. 1969, Gerwin 1979, Reimann 1980, Drazin and Van de Ven 
1985). They all reported that as the production process of work group become less routine, more uncertain, 
and/or more complex, its structure becomes more organic organization, with increased participation, autonomy, 
and informality for group members (The same cannot be said for most of the research studies examining 
structure and production process technology at the system (managerial) level. See Hickson et al. 1969). Since 
the choice of process technology is the decision variable for the firm, it may be argued that a particular process 
technology may tend to develop in response to certain market, technological, or industry characteristics. The 
possibility that such environmental factors are affecting both the adoption of particular process technologies 
and organizational structures has for long been ignored. It is surprising that few works in contingency theory 
literature attempts to answer the above question raised by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) from a different 
perspective or using a large-scale dataset. 
4 Aoki (1986, 1988) compares localized horizontal coordination with centralized hierarchical 
coordination and concludes that the latter is more efficient if information regarding emergent events is 
relatively more precisely monitored at the top level and concomitant centralized solutions are more swiftly 
implemented at the shop-floor level without distortion. In such situations where gradual and speedy reaction to 
on-site local information is more efficient, however, self-managed on-line teams will likely be chosen as 
effective coordination and decision making device.   
Dessein and Santos (2006) also analyzes how organizations choose the level of adaptation to a 
chancing environment when coordination among specialized tasks is a concern.  One of their important 
findings is that the relationship between the need for task bundling (e.g. job enlargement or multi-tasking) and 
the quality of communication channels is not monotone.  On the one hand, an improvement in the quality of 
communication makes it easier to coordinate specialized activities, reducing the need for task bundling. On the 
other hand, as coordination through communication improves, the organization will find it optimal to increase 
employee flexibility and become more adaptive, favoring more task bundling in order to reduce coordination 
failures. The latter effect tends to dominate the former when communication channels are poor and/or the 
interdependence among specialized activities is high. Dessein and Santos (2006) also shows that broad job 
assignment and investment in the quality of communication co-vary at the optimum under a reasonable 
assumption. 
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novel finding (which is consistent with the theory) is that the adoption of both self-managed 
online teams and cross-functional offline teams usually arises in firms with shop-floor 
committees while the introduction of cross-functional offline teams alone often takes place in 
firms with labor-management committees. We also confirm implications from our theory that 
firms in more competitive markets are more likely to adopt both types of teams while firms 
facing more erratic price movement tend not to adopt self-managed online teams. 
In the next section, we present our theoretical exploration, followed by the empirical 
analysis of the new Japanese data with a brief introduction to the new survey in Section III. 
Concluding remarks are offered in Section IV. 
 
II. Theoretical exploration 
In this section, we present a team-theoretic model that will be used to explain the firm’s 
decision to introduce innovative HRMPs. As in Dessein and Santos (2006), we assume that 
production requires the combination of n tasks and the firm’s profit depends on how well it 
adapts to the organizational environment and how well tasks are coordinated with each other.  
We assume that the firm can do two things to enhance its coordination capabilities: (1) decision 
rights are retained in the hands of the management to coordinate perfectly among tasks at the 
expense of adaptation; or (2) tasks are bundled and delegated to teams so that coordination 
within teams will be perfect. Unlike Dessein and Santos (2006), we interpret task bundling as 
team formation instead of job enlargement. Namely, when employees work in teams, the quality 
of communication within teams improves significantly and the members obtain “perfect” 
coordination among the tasks. 
 Task i requires taking primary action aii to adapt to a changing environment and 
complementary actions aij (for all j such that j ≠ i) to coordinate with other activities in the firm.  
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There are two types of information that are relevant to the choice of optimal actions: η, set of 
systematic environmental information, and θ i (i = 1,…,n), local environmental information that 
is only observed by those working on task i. The former is the set of information that affects the 
optimal action in each task systematically including macro-economic conditions, emergence of 
new technology, and changes in customer taste while the latter is the one that is relevant only to 
the task where the information is observed. θ i is a random variable whose prior distribution is 
assumed to be known to all members of the firm. The set of systematic information η can be 
used to update the prior distribution of θ i to obtain more accurate prescription for desirable 
actions. Let )|()(ˆ ηθηθ ii E=  and )|()(2 ηθησ iVar=  where the variance is common across i. 
Assume )()(0 222 φσησσ ≤≤<  where φ  indicates the null set meaning that the decision maker 
has no systematic information. When 'η η⊂ , 2 2( ) ( ')σ η σ η≥ . The adaptation calls for the use 
of local information and the primary action aii should be set equal to θ i. On the other hand, to 
achieve perfect coordination between i and j, action aij should be set equal to the primary action 
ajj.  Let Ci be the adaptation and coordination losses for task i. Then,  
1 2 2 2( , , , ) ( ) ( )i i i ni ii i ji ii
j i
C a a a a a aα θ β
≠
= − + −∑K  (1.1)   
where the parameters α and β determine the importance of adaptation and coordination 
respectively.  
Each task can be assigned either to one employee or a group of employees. t tasks can 
be assigned to a group of t employees where 1 ≤ t ≤ n. Hence, t = 1 is simply a special case of 
team assignment where each task is assigned to an individual. We denote by T(i) the group of 
employees to which task i is assigned. To simplify our analysis, we restrict the team structure to 
be “almost” symmetric meaning that all teams have either l members or l +1 members where l ≥ 
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1 is an integer. By abusing notation, we let t stand for the average size of teams in the firm.  
Namely, 1{ | ( ) | | ( ) is "almost" symmetric}
i
t T T i T i
n
∈ = ∑  where | ( ) |T i  stands for the number 
of members in T(i). θ i is Hayekian in the sense that employees can share the realization of the 
local information θ i only by working closely together but cannot transmit the information to the 
management ex post within the time period in which planned decisions may be revised. We 
assume that employees in T(i) can jointly observe θ i prior to the actual implementation of the 
actions, hence ji iia a=  for ( )j T i∈ . Therefore, t should not be interpreted just as the size of 
teams, rather it is the degree of task bundling and multitasking as is modeled by Dessein and 
Santos (2006) as team members need to work together, share information, and constantly 
coordinate their activities within teams. The local information can also be communicated to other 
colleagues outside teams when the outsiders happen to have close interaction with the team 
members that facilitate the transfer of the tacit information. Following Dessein and Santos (2006), 
we model such communication in the following way: each team T(i) sends a message concerning 
θ i to all employees outside the team. With a probability p, an employee in charge of task j ∉ T(i) 
perfectly understands the message and takes the complementary action aji that is set precise equal 
to the primary action aji. With the probability of 1 – p, the message concerning θ i will be pure 
noise for the employee, and thus the choice of the relevant complementary action aji cannot be 
made contingent on it.  
There are costs associated with team formation such as training cost, communication 
cost, and the cost of practices supporting team activities. Furthermore, the firm develops 
communication channels such as cross-functional off-line teams, and invests in information and 
communication tools to raise p. Let h(t, p,τ) be the total cost of such expenditures for team 
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formation and intra-firm horizontal communication per employee where the parameter τ denotes 
the firm’s capability of training its employees for better workplace communication and team 
activities. Such capability depends on the firm’s pre-existing conditions including 
labor-management relationship, corporate culture, adoption of multi-skilling practices such as 
job rotation, quality of workforce, and accumulation of human capital. h(t, p,τ) is increasing in (t, 
p) but non-increasing in τ with h(1, 0,τ) = 0. The firm develops communication channels to raise 
p and the level of such investment in communication quality is optimally chosen.   
We assume that management obtains some systematic information from various 
activities including the use of consultants, market and technology research, and thorough the 
analyses of its operations but observes no local information directly. On the other hand, 
employees observe their local information relevant to their own tasks but have no direct access to 
systematic information. With the spirit of Aoki (1986, 2001), we first consider two distinct 
modes of information processing systems: vertical control and horizontal coordination and 
assume that the firm chooses the information processing system that minimizes the sum of 
adaptation and coordination losses and the cost of team formation. Later, we will consider a 
hybrid mode of information processing: participatory control system. 
 
A. Vertical Control System 
When the systematic information possessed at the top is sufficient to infer the local 
information collected at the lower levels of organization relatively precisely, the management 
will try to pre-specify both primary and complementary actions to minimize coordination losses. 
The management’s instructions, however, are not necessarily understood correctly by their 
employees. There could be communication errors, distortion, or delay in implementation during 
which the environment may change. We assume that a noise vij is added to the management’s 
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instruction for the action aij where vij’s are independent of each other and θ i’s and have a 
common variance 2vσ . Since forming teams or investment in communication quality creates no 
economic value in this system but imposes the cost h(t, p, π) to the firm, each task is assigned to 
an individual who is not required to work in team or communicate local information to other 
employees. i.e. h(1,0,τ) = 0.  The employee assigned task i takes ˆ ( )ii i iia vθ η= +  and 
ˆ ( )ij j ija vθ η= +  (for j ≠ i).     
With this vertical control system, the organization’s total cost is given by  
1 2 2 2
1 1
2 2 2
[ ( , , , ) | ] [( ) | ] [( ) | ]
( ( ) ) 2 ( 1)
n n
i i i ni ii i ji ii
i i j i
v v
E C a a a E a E a a
n n n
θ θ θη α θ η β η
α σ η σ βσ
= = ≠
= − + −
= + + −
∑ ∑ ∑K  (1.2) 
 Note that the firm may perform better by building a bureaucratic organization where all 
activities are governed by routines and the management does not respond to new environment.  
Namely, when the firm sets ˆ ( )ii ji ia a θ φ= =  for all i and j,  
 1 2 2
1
[ ( , , , )] ( )
n
i i i ni
i
E C a a a nθ ασ φ= =∑ K  
To simplify our discussion, we assume that such bureaucratic organizations are never 
the optimal in modern business world. Formally stated:  
Assumption 1 2 2 2 2( ( ) ) 2( 1) ( )v vnα σ η σ βσ ασ φ+ + − <  
Assumption 1 implies that 
2
2 2 2
2( 1)( )
( ) ( )
v
v
n βσα α β σ φ σ η σ
−> ≡ − −  or 
2 2 2
2
( ( ) ( ) )( )
2( 1)
v
vn
α σ φ σ η σβ β α σ
− −< ≡ − . Namely, it requires that the adaptation to changing business 
environment is sufficiently important and the interdependency among tasks that necessitates 
coordinated activities is not so high.   
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B. Horizontal Coordination System 
When the management believes that adaptation at the lower levels of organization creates 
substantial economic value, they will let the employees choose their own actions. As is 
conventional with team-theoretical models, we assume that there is no conflict of interests 
between the management and the employees and the latter choose their actions to minimize the 
firm’s cost. We believe, however, that choosing the optimal actions taking into account the 
possibility of coordination failure requires more highly trained employees than obeying the 
bosses’ instructions does in the vertical control system. Hence, we assume that the firm has to 
pay additional wage cost to hire more educated workers or provide additional training to help 
empowered workers to make decisions. Let d be such a cost. The total adaptation and 
coordination cost (including that for team formation and human capital) is  
1 2 2 2
, ( )
( , , , , , ) ( ) ( ) ( , , )i i i ni ii i ji ii
i i i j T i
C a a a T p a a a nh t p ndα θ β τ
∉
= − + − + +∑ ∑ ∑K  (1.3) 
Note that the coordination losses within the same team T(i) do not appear in the expression 
because we expect the members of T(i) to perfectly coordinate among themselves. The average 
size of teams t and the precision of horizontal communication p are chosen by the management 
but the actual actions are taken by the employees themselves.   
The timing of the decision-making is as follows: 
1. Once the management chooses the horizontal coordination system, they determine the 
size of teams t and the investment in communication quality p. 
2. The local information , 1, 2,...,i i nθ = , are realized and observed by the employees of 
the group in charge of task i.  
3. Workers communicate the realizations of local information, and with an independent 
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probability p, these communications are successful.  Whether or not communications 
are successful is known by the receivers of the information only and the sender does not 
find the outcome of the communication. 
4. For all 1, 2,...,i n= , the employees of the group in charge of task i choose actions 
, 1, 2,...,ija j n= , that would minimize the expected cost function (1.3), subject to their 
information constraints.  
First, it is important to realize that the employees in charge of task i do not necessarily choose 
ii ia θ= , the action that adapt to the environment perfectly, because it raises the cost of 
coordination failure that takes place when the communications with other employees failed.  
Note that the decision-makers for task i minimize 2 2
( )
( ) ( )ii i ji ii
j T i
a a aα θ β
∉
− + −∑ .  Let ˆ jia  be 
the complementary action taken by the employees outside of T(i) who fail to receive the right 
information from the decision-maker for task i. The optimal primary action *iia  and ˆ jia  satisfy 
* ˆ( )(1 )
( )(1 )
i ji
ii n t p aa
n t p
αθ β
α β
+ − −= + − −  and 
*ˆ
i
ji iia E a
θ
= .  (1.4) 
By solving (1.4), we get 
 * ˆ ˆ( ) [ ]( ( ))
( )(1 )
ii ia
n t p
αθ φ θ θ φα β= + −+ − −    (1.5) 
and  
 
*  when task  learns              
ˆ ( )   when task  does not learn 
ii i
ji
i i
a j
a
j
θ
θ φ θ
⎧⎪= ⎨⎪⎩
   (1.6) 
Hence, with the horizontal coordination system, the total cost is given by  
1 2 2
1
( )(1 )[ ( , , , , , ) | ] ( ) ( , , )
( )(1 )
n
i i i ni
i
n t pE C a a a T p n nh t p nd
n t pθ
αβφ σ φ τα β=
− −= + ++ − −∑ K  (1.7) 
The management will choose (t, p) to minimize this cost function. Let t* and p* be the 
 11
optimal size of team and the optimal investment in communication quality. In order to insure the 
uniqueness of the optimal organizational design, we make the following assumptions: 
Assumption 2 The function 1 2
1
[ ( , , , , , ) | ]
n
i i i ni
i
E C a a a T pθ φ=∑ K  is strictly quasi-convex in (t, p).   
Assumption 3 ( , , )h t p
n t
τ
−  is submodular (or –
( , , )h t p
n t
τ
− is supermodular), namely the function 
has non-increasing differences for any pair of (t, p,τ).5  
Since each employee has to send a signal to (n – t) employees outside his team and 
evaluate the signals concerning (n – t) tasks, ( , , )h t p
n t
τ
− can be interpreted as the opportunity cost 
for communicating with other employees to determine the optimal complementary actions per 
task. This submodularity assumption is reasonable because: (1) the greater is the average team 
size, the higher is the chance that an arbitrary outsider happens to have close interaction with 
someone in T(i) leading to a better communication quality; and (2) the higher is the firm’s 
capability of training its employees for teamwork, the easier will be to increase team size and 
communication quality.   
 Next, we state the proposition due to Dessein and Santos (2006):  
Proposition 1 Suppose the horizontal coordination is more efficient than the vertical control 
system. Team size, t*, and the quality of communication channels, p*, are increasing in the 
parameters α, 2 ( )σ φ  and τ. (Proof in the Appendix). 
The use of teamwork and communication channels will be more extensive as the 
importance of adaptation, the uncertainty of business environment, and the firm’s capability of 
team building and supporting horizontal communication are greater. Note that assumption 3 is 
                                                 
5 Function f(x,y) is said to have non-increasing differences when ( , ) ( , )f x y h x y−  is non-increasing in 
y for any x x> . 
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critical in generating this monotonicity result.  
 As Dessein and Santos (2006) discuss, t* and p* are not necessarily monotonically 
increasing in β, the degree of task interdependence or the cost of coordination failure, contrary to 
the conventional wisdom. While an increase in β encourages the firm to raise t* and p* to hold 
down the coordination cost, it also induces the firm to take less adaptive primary actions (i.e. 
farther apart from iθ ), which in turn reduces the need to coordinate among employees. Therefore, 
t* and p* are monotonically increasing in β only when α, the importance of adaptation, is 
sufficiently high. 
 
C. Choice of Management System 
The firm will choose the vertical control system (horizontal coordination system), if  
1 2 1 2
1 1
[ ( , , , ) | ] < [ ( , , , , , ) | ]
(>)
n n
i i i ni i i i ni
i i
E C a a a E C a a a T pθ θη φ= =∑ ∑K K  
Or equivalently, 
* *
2 2 2 2 * *
* *
( )(1 )( ( ) ) 2 ( 1) ( ) ( , , ) 
/ ( )(1 )( )
v v
n t pn h t p d
n t p
αα σ η σ β σ σ φ τα β
− −+ + − < + ++ − −>   
        (1.8) 
Note that the left-hand side, the adaptation and coordination losses in the vertical control 
system, is a linear function of α and β while the right-hand side, those in the horizontal 
coordination system, is a concave function of α and β.  Figure 1 and 2 illustrates the cost 
structures of the two systems. As α increases or β decreases, the optimal primary actions chosen 
in the horizontal coordination system approach to 1{ ,..., }nθ θ , the true state of the environment, to 
reduce adaptation losses, and the management readjust t and p, the extent of teamwork and the 
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investment in communication quality to reduce the coordination cost. Therefore, the adaptation 
and coordination losses do not rise in proportion with the increase in α and β  in the horizontal 
coordination system. As Figure 1 shows, the horizontal coordination system should perform well 
for a sufficiently large α. We state this result in the form of proposition:  
Proposition 2 Holding the other parameters fixed, there existsαˆ such that the horizontal 
coordination system functions better for all α >αˆ . (Proof in the Appendix).  
In theory, it is imaginable that, for a very small α, the horizontal coordination system 
becomes more efficient if the additional employment cost d is sufficiently small relative to the 
cost of errors in vertical communication 22 ( 1) vnβ σ− . The dotted line in Figure 1 illustrates the 
possibility. In such a case, the choice of management system could become non-monotonic. 
Namely, the horizontal coordination system is adopted for very small α and a sufficiently large 
α.  
In reality, however, delegating strategically or operationally critical decision problems to 
lower-level employees is a risky managerial policy. Hence, the policy requires substantial 
investment in employee training which raises d. Then, unless more adaptation generates 
substantial returns to the firm, it is unlikely to adopt the horizontal coordination system.  
Therefore, we conjecture that as α increases, the horizontal coordination system is more likely to 
be adopted. With this conjecture and Proposition 1 combined together, we get the following 
implication: team organization is more likely to be adopted, investment in horizontal 
communication channels to raise p is likely to be greater, as adaptation to a new environment 
becomes more important. So the next question is when adaptation is more likely to be relevant 
for the firm’s success. We argue that speedy adaptation creates more value when the competition 
is more intense (i.e. slow response to environmental changes could result in bankruptcy), and 
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when the product development cycle is shorter (i.e. technological changes and/or changes in 
customer taste or needs are rapid).  
 Before presenting a similar result for coordination parameter β, we add one more 
assumption to ensure that the horizontal coordination system could be optimal for a certain range 
of β. 
Assumption 4 2 2( ( ) )vd α σ η σ< +  
Proposition 3 Holding the other parameters fixed, there exists βˆ  such that the horizontal 
coordination system functions better for ˆβ β< . (Proof in the Appendix).    
When d is sufficiently large relative to the cost of errors in vertical 
communication 22 ( 1) vnβ σ− , the horizontal coordination system could be optimal for a 
sufficiently high β . This case is illustrated by the dotted curve in Figure 2. Together with our 
earlier discussion that the relationships between (t, p) and β are not monotone in general in the 
range where the horizontal coordination system is efficient, the result reinforced our view that 
there is little clear-cut implication about how the adoption of self-managed teams and horizontal 
communication channels are related to the needs of coordinated actions. Nevertheless, we will 
attempt to explore the issue empirically. 
What factors would raise the value of coordination? One possible argument is that the 
need to coordinate activities across units depends on the product or business architecture (Ulrich 
1995, Baldwin and Clark 2000, Fujimoto et al. 2001). Researchers in design theory argue that 
there are two distinct types of product architecture: modular and integral. Modular architecture 
has the design rule that requires one-to-one mapping between functions and components and thus 
each component is self-contained. Products designed under this rule often has standardized 
interface and therefore is compatible. Very naturally, modular architecture could lead to open 
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procurement systems where the assemblers could buy most necessary components in spot 
markets. Integral architecture assumes complex multi-dimensional linkage between functions 
and components. This means that in order to improve on one function, the designer has to 
re-work on and coordinate across multiple components. The procurement system will be closed 
if the architecture is integral or the interface is not standardized in modular architecture. 
According to Fujimoto et al. (2001), the type of architecture is not necessarily determined by the 
industries where the firms operate but rather it is the product of technology adopted and business 
process strategically chosen by each firm. Therefore, it is possible that we observe variation in 
product architecture even in the same product market. As Baldwin and Clark (2000) and 
Fujimoto et al. (2001) have implied, modularization of product architecture induces 
disintegration of production process and reduces transaction costs in spot markets and 
encourages competition among suppliers.   
Presumably β is greater when the firm adopts integral architecture. Furthermore, when 
the customer adopts the integral product architecture, the buyer-supplier relationship will likely 
become more long-term and exposes suppliers to less spot market competition:  
Proposition 4 As the systematic information becomes more important (i.e. )(2 ησ gets smaller) 
and the labor-management communication involves less noise (i.e. 2vσ  becomes smaller), the 
vertical control system becomes more desirable. On the other hand, as the pre-conditions that 
facilitate team formation and inter-team communication prevail (i.e. τ rises), the horizontal 
coordination system is likely to be superior. (Proof is straightforward from (1.8) and thus 
omitted).  
Proposition 4 may imply that as the technological and market changes become more 
disruptive, primary actions and coordination responsibilities are less likely to be delegated to 
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lower-level employees because local information is less likely to be sufficient for the employees 
to engage in complex coordination activities in such occasions. This result together with other 
implications from (1.8) is consistent with the findings in Itoh (1987). Namely, a higher level of 
global changes leads to more knowledge resources as the variance of the macroenvironment is 
relatively small, but reduces the total amount of resources as the variance exceeds a certain value. 
In our model, teams and communication quality are knowledge resources.  When )(2 ησ  is 
large so the information about the macroenvironment has relatively small value, the horizontal 
coordination system is adopted and an increase in 2 ( )σ φ  leads to increases in t and p 
(Proposition 1). But, when )(2 ησ  is small enough, an increase in 2 ( )σ φ  makes it more likely 
that the vertical control system is adopted (see (1.8)). 
A mechanism for better labor-management communication such as joint 
labor-management committees (JLMCs) may be complementary with vertical control system 
because it will reduce the communication errors or misunderstanding that might induce wrong 
actions to be taken by employees (i.e. smaller 2vσ ). The relative efficiency of hierarchical 
structures depends on whether they can implement centralized solutions swiftly without 
distortion. Knowing management decisions well, employees or teams will more likely take 
actions without delay or misunderstanding.6 
τ, the parameter of the firm’s capability to train its employees for team and 
communication activities could potentially include many attributes of the firm. For example, the 
                                                 
6 According to the Survey of Labor-Management Communication by the Ministry of Health, Labour, 
and Welfare conducted in 2004, more than 60 percent of the firms use JLMCs for information sharing for basic 
management decisions such as business strategies and production and sales plans. According to field research 
conducted at a variety of Japanese firms by Kato (2003), labor representatives to JLMCs believe that some of 
the information they receive from top management can be considered “insider information.” With such 
information on management decisions and their background, employees are more likely to internalize 
organizational goals (although it is still not a trivial task to motivate them) and implement the firm strategy in a 
coordinated fashion. 
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highly-skilled workforce with broad tasks will encourage the firm to adopt more decentralized 
decision-making structure. We will investigate the effect of human capital on the incidence of 
HRMPs in our empirical analyses. 
 
D. Hybrid coordination system 
Although hierarchical structure are often perceived to be incompatible with delegation or 
team organizations, increasing number of firms seem to try to combine the empowerment 
approach with the traditional hierarchical structure. For example, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) 
argue that “hypertext” organization which has two layers, the hierarchical business layer and the 
project team layer, is an effective way to acquire, create, exploit, and accumulate new knowledge. 
According to them, this type of organization has been adopted by a number of large Japanese 
firms including Sharp and Kao Corporation.   
We can now consider a hybrid organization where employees adjust their actions 
according to their local information after receiving instructions from the management. Let us call 
this information processing system “hybrid coordination” or “participatory control” 
interchangeably. The total adaptation and coordination losses for such organizations can be 
obtained simply by replacing 2 ( )σ φ  with 2 ( )σ η  in the cost function for horizontal 
coordination and adding the cost of vertical communication errors 2vσ . We further assume that the 
training cost in this system d’ is smaller than that in the horizontal coordination system, d. The 
total cost function for the type is 
1 2
1
** **
2 2 2 ** **
** **
[ ( , , , , , ) | ]
( )(1 ) ( )+ 2 ( 1) ( , , )   
/ ( )(1 )
n
i i i ni
i
v v
E C a a a T p
n t p n h t p d
n t p
θ η
α σ η ασ β σ τα β
=
− − ′= + − + ++ − −
∑ K
(1.9) 
 18
where **t  and **p  are chosen optimally to minimize the expression (1.9). 
The following two propositions are immediate: 
Proposition 5 Hybrid coordination system dominates traditional vertical control system if d’= 0. 
(Proof in the Appendix). 
 Note that the rationality required for employees in this hybrid coordination system is 
higher than that required for those in the vertical control system. In the latter, the employees only 
need to execute what is prescribed by the management. In the former, in contrast, the employees 
have to predict what complementary actions their colleagues might choose and solve the cost 
minimization problem as is discussed in equations (1.4)-(1.6). Therefore, only firms with capable 
employees and complementary practices can implement the hybrid coordination system. In other 
words, d’ is likely to be substantial and thus the vertical control system could still be the optimal. 
Note that hybrid coordination system does not always dominate the horizontal 
coordination system. When 2vσ sufficiently high, horizontal coordination is will be more efficient 
than hybrid coordination. Specifically, we can show that the adaptation and coordination cost in 
the horizontal coordination system is lower than in the hybrid coordination system for 
sufficiently small β and around β β=  when the difference between d and d’ is sufficiently small. 
Furthermore, we can show that workers are less adaptive in the firm with participatory control 
than in the one with horizontal coordination as follows: 
Proposition 6  ** *t t≤  and ** *p p≤ . (Proof in the Appendix). 
Proposition 6 implies that this participatory control system will not adopt all practices that 
horizontal coordination systems employ because marginal benefit of team organization or that of 
investment in communication quality is smaller. Especially, self-managed on-line teams often 
require substantial training and other complementary practices such as cross-training that are 
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costly. Cross-functional project teams may be less costly especially if they are monitored and 
controlled closely by the management.  
 
E. Compensation system 
Compensation contingent on performance at the individual or group level is usually 
perceived as complementary with work organization where employees are given a high level of 
discretion. Group incentives are especially likely to be desirable in organizations with highly 
autonomous teams and broad task bundling. Group incentives are subject to free-riding but 
multi-skilled workers in self-managed teams are more likely to engage in mutual monitoring 
and/or develop social ties within the group creating peer pressure that would effectively prevent 
free-riding. On the other hand, individual incentives will be at odds with team activities from the 
following three reasons: (1) individual performance is more difficult or costly to measure in a 
team setting; (2) individual incentives will discourage cooperation and coordination that are key 
to successful team activities; and (3) job rotation that is often necessary to enhance employees’ 
team skills will make it even more difficult to observe individual performance.  
 One caveat in applying the above idea to the Japanese data is that pay for performance 
introduced in Japanese firms is often coupled with management by objectives (MBO). Namely, 
employees are evaluated based on how much of their objectives are achieved and paid 
accordingly. Therefore, they are paid based on some subjective evaluation measures and the 
above issues of measurement and lack of cooperation may not be a serious problem. If a 
moderately-powered individual incentive scheme does not distort the employees’ allocation of 
effort in any significant way, adopting it together with group incentives may help balance the 
overall incentives given to employees while preventing opportunistic behaviors such as 
free-riding. If so, group incentives and individual incentives may appear to be correlated in the 
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actual data because they will both tend to be adopted when workers are empowered. 
 
III. Empirical Analysis 
Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has been conducting the ICT 
Workplace Survey (ICTWPS) annually since 2001, which provide data on IT investment and 
IT-related activities from about half of the 9,500 randomly selected enterprises that use 
computers in their businesses. As a supplement to the ICTWPS, METI allowed a team of 
researchers including us and our colleagues at the Tokyo Institute of Technology to conduct a 
new survey of Japanese firms, the HRMOS (HRM and Organization Survey of Japanese Firms) 
in November 2005.  The sample universe is all firms that responded at least once to the 
ICTWPS since 2001 and were in seven key industries – general machinery, electrical machinery, 
information and communication electronics equipment, transportation equipment, precision 
instruments and machinery, retail, and financial. It turned out that 9,500 firms responded to the 
ICTWPS at least once since 2001 and that out of them 3,017 firms were in those seven 
industries.       
Specifically, we sent the questionnaires in November 2005 to each of those 3,017 firms, 
asking the director of management planning and the director of human resource management to 
fill out the separate sections of questionnaires. We received usable responses from 365 firms (a 
response rate of 12.1%). Among those, there were 192 firms in manufacturing and 173 firms in 
non-manufacturing. 80 firms are listed on Japan’s stock exchanges. Our response rate is neither 
particularly high nor unusually low for a mail-in survey of Japanese firms.7 
                                                 
7 For instance, in June of 1991, the Rengo Sogo Seikatsu Kaihatsu Kenkyu Jo (Rengo Research 
Institute of General Life Development) mailed their questionnaire asking questions on labor conditions and 
employee participation/involvement to 6,800 firms (including both public and private firms in Japan) and 
received usable responses from 689 firms (a response rate of 10%). In June of 1989, the Japan Productivity 
Center mailed their questionnaire asking questions on HRMPs to 1030 firms in Japan and received usable 
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To study the representativeness of our sample, we first compare the distribution of our 
sample firms (respondents to the HRMOS) by industry with that of respondents to ICTWPS 
2005 that are in the seven industries assuming that the distribution of the latter is similar to our 
sample universe (respondents to ICTWPS 2001-2005 that are in the seven industries). The 
industrial make-up of our sample is largely comparable to that of the population except that our 
sample includes relatively more firms in general machinery and fewer firms in financial service. 
In addition, we find that the average firm in our sample is smaller than the average firm in the 
populations (employing 1,103 workers as opposed to 1,659 workers).   
Next, it is plausible that firms with more innovative HRMPs are more likely to respond to 
our survey. To shed some light on the extent of such response bias, we compare the proportion of 
firms with innovative HRMPs calculated from our survey to what has been calculated from the 
three earlier and larger surveys. First, regarding Pay For Performance (PFP) and PSP (Profit 
Sharing Plan), there is a comparable yet larger governmental survey of Japanese firms called the 
General Survey of Employment Conditions (Syuuro Jyoken Sogo Chosa) conducted by the 
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare in 2004. The proportions of firms with PFP and PSP in 
our sample are 48.1 percent and 45.4 percent respectively, and the comparable figures from the 
General Survey of Employment Conditions turn out to be reasonably similar (50.5 percent and 
53.6 percent respectively). 
Unfortunately, for employee involvement programs, there is no comparable, larger 
governmental survey. The only governmental survey that provides somewhat similar information 
is the Survey of Labor-Management Communications (Roshi Komyunikeishon Chosa) 
conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare. The SLMC reports that in 2004, 37.3 
                                                                                                                                                             
responses from 203 firms (a response rate of 19.7%). Kato and Morishima (2003)’s HRM Survey of Japanese 
Firms in 2001, which is perhaps the closest to our survey in terms of the content of the questionnaire, had a 
response rate of 17%. 
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percent of establishments had JLMCs; and 49.8 percent with SFCs. According to our survey, 
55.4 percent of firms had JLMCs and 38 percent with SFCs in the same year. A simple 
comparison of the incidence of JLMCs and SFCs between our survey and the SLMC appears to 
point to an overrepresentation of our sample by firms with JLMCs and underrepresentation by 
firms with SFCs. However, there is an important difference between the two surveys which may 
account for the discrepancy in the incidence of JLMCs and SFCs between the two surveys. The 
SLMC is a survey of establishments while ours is a survey of firms. Being a survey of 
establishments rather than firms, the SLMC naturally yields lower incidence of JLMCs and 
higher incidence of SFCs. Thus, some firms have JLMCs only at the headquarter level and their 
establishments have only SFCs and hence the proportion of establishments with JLMCs is 
naturally lower than that of firms with JLMCs. On the contrary, SFCs are more prevalent among 
larger firms than among smaller firms according to the SLMC. Larger firms are more likely to 
have more establishments. The proportion of establishments with SFCs tends to exceed that of 
firms with SFCs.8 
Our survey, HRMOS, is the first survey in Japan which provides comprehensive data on 
the use of newer forms of innovative work practices by Japanese firms. Specifically, the HRMOS 
asks Japanese firms about their use of: (i) Cross-functional off-line teams (CFOTs) in which 
members from different functions engage in activities to reduce costs and improve quality, 
services, and delivery performance under specific targets and action plans;9 (ii) Self-managed 
                                                 
8 To demonstrate this, consider there are two firms; large firm and small firm. The large firm has two 
establishments and each establishment has a SFC where as the small firm has only one establishment and has 
no SFC. The survey of firms will yield 50 percent for the proportion of firms with SFC whereas the survey of 
establishments will yield 66.7 percent for the proportion of establishments with SFC.   
9 Japanese firms (especially in manufacturing) have been known for the extensive use of small group 
activities, such as Kaizen, Zero Defect, and QC circles (Morita, 2001). The traditional form of such small 
group activities is rather narrow in its scope and often includes only workers from the same workplace (Kato, 
2003). Based on our own field research at multiple firms in Japan, however, the scope of such small group 
activities appears to have been expanding with increasing involvement of workers from different functions. 
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on-line teams (SMOTs) in which members in the workplace are given autonomy to decide on 
work processes and task coordination in order to share operational know-how and information 
and respond to market changes quickly; (iii) Pay for performance (PFP) through which wage or 
salary of an individual is linked to his/her own output or some other performance measure under 
a pre-determined rule; and (iv) Profit-sharing plans (PSPs) through which the total amount of 
bonuses is linked to a measure of firm performance, such as profit, sales, production, and value 
added.10  
The HRMOS also provides the most updated data on the use of more traditional and 
well-established forms of HRMPs: (i) Joint labor-management committees (JLMCs) serving as a 
mechanism for employee participation/involvement at the top level, covering a large variety of 
issues ranging from basic business policies to working conditions; and (ii) Shop-floor committees 
(SFCs) in which supervisors and employees discuss issues such as shop-floor operations and 
working conditions.11  
In addition, the HRMOS also asks Japanese firms about their use of management 
practices with growing popularity: (i) Benchmarking, or a formal system of learning about 
practices in other successful firms and used to help clarify where ones’ company stands, relative 
to others, in the practices that matter most in ones’ area of business; and (ii) Management by 
objectives (MBO) through which objectives are clarified, goals are set, and achievements for 
                                                                                                                                                             
Such extended small group activities are clearly considered CFOTs in our survey. 
10 Based on the literature which often stresses that much of the Japanese bonus payment system is a 
disguised regular wage, we are considering only the bonus system with a formal contract stipulating the 
presence of the profit-sharing plan. Such PSP bonus system is a relatively new and growing innovation in the 
Japanese pay system (see, for instance, Kato and Morishima, 2003 for PSPs in Japan).  
11 The HRMOS also provides data on another long-established HRMP in Japan: Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans (ESOPs) through which employees own shares of the firm for which they work, and keep 
their shares (and dividends) in trust (the firm matches each employee’s contribution by giving 5 to 10 percent 
of the contribution as well as bearing administrative costs. For the rest of the paper, we ignore ESOPs and 
focus on JLMCs and SFCs as older HRMPs. Adding ESOPs to the analysis produces no discernable change to 
our results. These results as well as all other unreported results are available upon request from Takao Kato at 
tkato@mail.colgate.edu. For these HRMPs, see, for instance, Jones and Kato (1995) and Kato (2003). 
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individual employee are assessed in a way that would coordinate the activities of employees to 
attain the firm’s strategic goal. 
Finally, the HRMOS also provides data on various firm characteristics, such as age of the 
firm, number of employees, whether the firm is listed in Japan’s stock exchanges, industry 
classifications, and education and training of labor force.  
In order to explore possible complementarities among HRMPs, we first look at how the 
incidence of a practice differs depending on the presence of other practices. Table 1 summarizes 
such conditional incidence rates (percentage of firms with a certain practice, conditional on the 
presence of another practice). First, 74% of firms with SMOTs also have CFOTs while the 
unconditional incidence rate of CFOTs is 54%. Likewise, the incidence rate of SMOTs 
conditional on the presence of CFOTs is 11 percentage-points higher than the unconditional 
incidence rate. The difference between the conditional and unconditional incidence rates is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level for both CFOTs and SMOTs. This is consistent with 
our theoretical finding that task bundling and investment in horizontal communication channels 
are complements (Proposition 1-3).12  
 Second, shop-floor committees seem to complement team activities. Firms with SFCs 
are more likely to have CFOTs and SMOTs (14 and 8 percentage-points more likely than the 
average firm respectively). The null hypothesis that either team organizations are introduced 
independently from SFCs is rejected at the 1% significance level.  We argue that SFCs play an 
important role both as a communication channel and a pre-condition that nurtures participatory 
corporate culture. Namely, empowered teams may need to coordinate activities and SFCs can 
                                                 
12 It also may be because both types of work practices often arise in relatively flat organizations with 
decentralized decision making structure and employees who are accustomed to employee empowerment can 
adapt to both activities.  
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work as an effective mechanism for information sharing and horizontal coordination. 
 Third, profit sharing plans and pay for performance tend to co-exist in the same 
organizations. 70% of firms with PSP have PFP and likewise 70% of those with PFP have PSP 
whereas the unconditional incidence rates are a little over 50% for both pay schemes.  
Moreover, there is some indication of complementarity between shop-floor committees 
and pay for performance. The incidence rate of PFP conditional on the presence of SFCs is 8 
percentage-points higher than its unconditional incidence rate. Since pay for performance is 
known to cause potentially negative effects including increased financial risk, less cooperative 
behavior, multi-tasking agency problems, ratchet effect, etc., it may be equally important to 
encourage cooperation, share expectation, and provide safeguards through employee 
organizations such as shop-floor committees.  
 Fourth, firms with benchmarking are more likely to adopt many of other HRMPs. To the 
extent that firms with benchmarking tend to copy HRMPs in successful firms with less regard to 
circumstantial differences, environmental factors may not explain the management decision to 
adopt new HRMPs in firms with benchmarking as much as other firms (which will be explored 
further in our probit analysis). 
The Survey also confirms our prior expectation that as compared to CFOTs, SMOTs, PFP, 
and PSPs, JLMCs and SFCs are indeed older and well-established practices. Nearly 80% of 
JLMCs and over 60 percent of SFCs were introduced before 1985. In contrast, the majority of 
CFOTs, SMOTs, PFP, and PSPs were introduced after 1985, and many of them were actually in 
existence for less than 5 years.    
When deliberating on the introduction of team organization and performance-based pay 
schemes in the 2000’s, Japanese firms were unlikely to be considering the introduction of JLMCs 
and SFCs at the same time. As such, the incidence of JLMCs and SFCs can be considered 
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exogenous determinants of the incidence of team and contingent pay. Also keep in mind that 
once JLMCs and SFCs are instituted, they are rarely abolished later (Kato, 2003). 
 
Probit Analysis: Exploring the Determinants of the HRMP Adoption 
To investigate with more precision the suggestive findings from the previous section, we 
further specify Probit models. Let NEWHRMi be a binary variable that assumes the value of 1 if 
Firm i has NEWHRM, zero otherwise. As we discussed before, for NEWHRM, we consider four 
newer forms of HRMP; (i) CFOT; (ii) SMOT; (iii) PSP; and (iv) PFP. We begin with the 
following benchmark probit model:  
(1) Pr(NEWHRMi = 1) = F(MARKETi, JLMCi, SFCi, FIRMi, industry dummy)    
where MARKETi = a vector of variables capturing output market conditions for Firm i; JLMCi 
=1 if Firm i has JLMC, 0 otherwise; SFCi =1 if Firm i has SFC, 0 otherwise; and FIRMi = a 
vector of variables capturing firm characteristics.  
A key insight from our theoretical section is the potentially crucial role that output 
market conditions play in shaping the nature of HRM system. The data will enable us to use 
three variables to capture such output market conditions: (i) Overseas Sales Ratio; (ii) Customer 
Concentration (concentration of sales in major customers); and (iii) Extent of Price Changes 
(magnitude of price changes by competitors for major products). The Overseas Sales Ratio is 
designed to capture the firm’s exposure to stiff global competition which may play a vital role in 
the adoption of certain HRM practices. For example, accordingly to Proposition 1 and 2 (see 
Section 2), firms are more likely to invest in communication quality when adaptation to the 
environment becomes more crucial for them in a highly competitive output market. To the extent 
to which CFOTs (Cross-functional Offline Teams) are a form of investment in communication 
quality, we expect that CFOTs are more prevalent in firms with higher Overseas Sales Ratios, 
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ceteris paribus.  
As we discussed also in Section 2, high customer concentration may be a reflection of 
long-term buyer-supplier relationship and product architecture that makes cross-functional 
coordination failure more costly than usual (i.e. high β). The positive correlation between 
customer concentration and the adoption of cross-functional off-line teams may imply that the 
buyer-supplier transactions supported by long-term relationships may also tend to require tight 
in-house cross-functional coordination to improve the satisfaction of a small number of buyers.   
Proposition 4 in the theory section suggests that in burgeoning market with technological 
uncertainty or cyclical market with large price fluctuations, fewer firms will adopt self-managed 
on-line teams for the following two reasons. First, teams which react to on-site information are 
less likely to possess sufficient information to find systematically optimal solutions in such 
disruptive environment. Therefore, the advantage of quickly utilizing on-the-spot information 
will be more than offset by the cost of choosing suboptimal solutions in an imperfectly 
coordinated manner. Second, self-managed on-line teams require a relatively stable membership 
and management’s commitment so that members can learn their tasks, new skills, and how to 
work together. This stability is at risk when demand fluctuates widely and the management finds 
it difficult to commit to maintaining teams. As a result, more hierarchical control system may be 
chosen and self-managed on-line teams are less likely to be adopted. 
Since a non-trivial number of firms failed to provide data on Customer Concentration and 
Extent of Price Changes, we begin with considering only Overseas Sales Ratio and hence 
maintaining the largest possible sample size, and then introduce the remaining two market 
condition measures. Reassuringly our key results turn out to be insensitive to the inclusion of 
those two additional market condition measures and hence a loss of observations (except for our 
results on these two additional market condition variables themselves, of course).  
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Another major insight from our theoretical exploration in the previous section is the 
potentially vital roles that long-established, more traditional employment practices play in the 
firm’s adoption of newer forms of innovative work practices. JLMCs and SFCs are such 
pre-existing, long-established work practices that are by now well-known ingredients of the 
“Japanese management system”.13 Our theoretical exploration provides some guidance on what 
to expect on the interplay between such long-established practices and newer forms of innovative 
work practices. For instance, our theoretical exploration suggests that formal shop-floor-based 
communication channel facilitates the introduction of team-based instruments for information 
sharing and problem-solving since both are complements in the horizontal coordination system. 
Moreover, JLMCs favor vertical control system by reducing labor-management 
communication errors, and hence firms with well-established JLMCs are less likely to adopt 
team-based instruments for the horizontal coordination system. 
For controls, our data allow for the use of firm age; number of employees as a firm size 
measure; whether or not the firm is a listed firm in Japan’s stock exchanges; and industry dummy 
variables (see Table 2 for the definitions of these variables).  
After estimating the benchmark model, we augment the model with two additional sets of 
variables. First, Proposition 4 suggests that the scope, nature and quantity of human capital 
accumulated by the firm’s labor force may play an important role in the firm’s choice of HRM 
system. Unfortunately, the scope, nature and quantity of human capital are difficult to quantify 
and we are left with two rather ordinary variables, College Graduates (percent of labor force with 
college or postgraduate degrees) and Training for New Hires (days spent in formal training for 
new hires). Second, our theoretical exploration points to possible interplay between the choice of 
HRMPs and benchmarking/MBO (e.g., complementarity of PFP and MBO as discussed in the 
                                                 
13 See for instance Kato (2003) for institutional details on JLMCs and SFCs. 
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previous section). Thus we consider Benchmarking (=1 if the firm uses benchmarking, 0 
otherwise) and MBO (=1 if the firm uses MBO 0 otherwise).            
We are somewhat less confident on our results from these additional specifications as 
compared to those from the benchmark model, for human capital formation and management 
strategy such as benchmarking and MBO are mostly likely to be endogenous than JLMCs and 
SFCs, and the results from these augmented specifications ought to be interpreted with caution.14   
The first two columns of Table 3 present the probit estimates of Eq. (1), our benchmark 
model with CFOTs as the dependent variable. The first column is a parsimonious specification in 
which only the overseas sales ratio is used for MARKET whereas the second includes two 
additional variables for MARKET (and hence with a smaller sample size). The third column 
summarizes the probit estimates of Eq. (1) augmented by human capital formation variables and 
the fourth presents the probit estimates of Eq. (1) augmented by management strategy variables.  
We find the following three results consistently for all specifications. First, the estimated 
coefficients on the Overseas Sales Ratio are positive and significant at the 5 percent level, 
confirming that firms exposed to stiff global competition are more likely to adopt 
cross-functional off-line teams. Since we control for industries, it is not mere reflection of 
inter-industry differences in export ratio and diffusion of teams. This result is consistent with 
Proposition 2 as we discussed earlier. The result is robust to the inclusion of two additional 
variables for MARKET in the benchmark model as well as to the use of two augmented 
specifications (one with human capital and the other with management strategies).  
Second, the estimated coefficients on Customer Concentration are positive and significant 
at the 5 percent level. Firms with higher concentration of sales in top five customers is more 
likely to have cross-functional off-line teams, suggesting that the buyer-supplier transactions 
                                                 
14 Unfortunately, no reliable instrument is available in our dataset.  
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supported by long-term relationships may also tend to require tight in-house cross-functional 
coordination to improve the satisfaction of a small number of buyers.   
Third, the estimated coefficients on SFC are positive and significant at the 1 percent level, 
confirming our expectation that formal shop-floor-based communication channels facilitate the 
introduction of team-based instruments for information sharing and problem-solving. As such the 
result is consistent with what our theoretical exploration suggests about complementary practices 
in the horizontal coordination system. 
The estimated coefficients on the human capital variables are of expected sign yet not 
statistically significant even at the 10 percent level. As we argued earlier, we suspect the lack of 
significance may be due to the imprecise measure of the scope, nature and quantity of human 
capital accumulated by the firm’s labor force. Finally, we find no statistically significant 
association between management strategies (benchmarking/MBO) and the use of CFOTs.   
Table 4 reports the probit estimates with SMOT as the dependent variable. The most 
robust results on the incidence of the SMOT are the statistically significant estimated coefficients 
on JLMCs and SFCs. For all specifications, the estimated coefficients on JLMCs are negative 
and statistically significant at the 5 percent level, confirming our expectation that JLMCs favor 
vertical control system by reducing labor-management communication errors, and hence make 
firms less likely to adopt SMOT. Likewise, to be consistent with our theoretical prediction that 
SMOTs and SFCs are complements and facilitate horizontal coordination, the estimated 
coefficients on SFCs are positive and statistically significant (the significance level varies from 1 
percent to 10 percent).  
Regarding the MARKET variables, we find that the estimated coefficients on Range of 
Price Changes are negative and significant at the 5 percent level for two out of the three 
specifications. As we discussed earlier, price volatility reflects the variance of the market 
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environment, which will be better monitored by the management than by lower-level managers 
or employees. The negative coefficients on Range of Price Changes are congruent with our 
theoretical exploration (Proposition 4): vertical control dominates horizontal coordination when 
systematic information is sufficiently important.  
Our human capital variables appear to do slightly better here than in the case of CFOTs. 
Thus, the estimated coefficient on Training for New Hires is positive and significant at the 10 
percent level, pointing to complementarity between training and SMOTs. The management 
practice variables (benchmarking/MBO) are again found to be not significantly associated with 
the incidence of SMOTs.   
Tables 5 and 6 report the probit estimates with PFP, and PSP as the dependent variable 
respectively. Table 5 shows that the estimated coefficient on MBO is positive and highly 
significant (significant at the 1 percent level), supporting our theoretical discussion that MBO is 
a reasonable complement for PFP since MBO involves elaborate evaluation process of 
employees’ achievement of their individual goals. Furthermore, even if some objective 
performance measures are available without cost, MBO may be necessary for the following 
reason. It is well-known that PFP is subject to multi-tasking agency problems (Holmstrom and 
Milgrom 1991). Namely, employees working on multiple tasks may distort their allocation of 
efforts when facing strong incentives. One solution to this problem is to use additionally more 
comprehensive subjective evaluation. 
In addition, the estimated coefficients on SFCs are positive and statistically significant at 
the 5 percent level for two out of the four specifications, suggesting a possible complementarity 
between SFCs and PFP. As we discussed in the theory section and confirmed empirically above, 
in the Japanese context, PFP is often used along with MBO to mitigate the free-rider problem of 
the horizontal coordination system with group incentive. As confirmed empirically earlier, SFCs 
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facilitate the horizontal coordination system and hence it is not surprising that we find the 
positive coefficients on SFCs.  
Table 6 shows very few significant results on the incidence of PSPs. The only 
consistently significant estimates are obtained for Benchmarking, suggesting that firms with 
benchmarking are more likely to use PSPs. It is somewhat surprising that SFCs does not have a 
significant positive effect on the adoption of group incentives given the theoretical implication 
that group incentives are complementary with the horizontal coordination system, which often 
appear in the firms with SFCs according to our earlier probit estimates. Possible explanation for 
this puzzle is as follows: the bulk of regular pay for Japanese workers is determined by their skill 
grades and merit rating by their supervisors in a majority of large Japanese firms (see Koike, 
2005 for example).15 Promotion to a higher skill grade does depend on seniority yet it is hardly 
automatic. An active and successful participation in collective problem solving activities is a key 
criterion for promotion to a higher skill grade and hence a higher regular pay. In short, the typical 
regular pay system for Japanese workers already contains an element of group incentive, and 
perhaps need for the introduction of a formal and separate group incentive pay (such as 
gainsharing) is less acute in Japan.  
 
Cluster Analysis: Identifying Systems of HRMPs 
Finally, to explore further a key message of our theoretical exploration that complementary 
elements of a HRM system are introduced together to maximize the benefits of each system, we 
conduct cluster analysis to identify the most common combinations of HRMPs. Using Ward’ 
method, we sort firms into four groups with distinct sets of work organization and pay 
                                                 
15 A share of firms with a skill grade system, however, seems to be declining recently according to 
numerous business reports. 
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schemes.16 In the clustering algorithm, distances are based only on the proportions of employees 
(measured by five-point scale) in four newer HRMPs: cross-functional off-line teams, 
self-managed teams, pay-for-performance, and profit sharing plans. Namely, the characteristics 
of firm i takes the vector ),,,( iPSP
i
PFP
i
SMOT
i
CFOT xxxx  where ikx  (k = CFOT, SMOT, PFP, PSP) 
can take any integer between 0 and 4. Each variable has 0 for “not adopted,” 1 for “less than 
25% of employees participate,” 2 for “25% or more but less than 50% of employees participate,” 
3 for “50% or more but less than 75% of employees participate,” or 4 for “75% or more 
employees participate.”  
 Table 7 shows the results. System 1 is the traditional HRM and work system and does 
not employ any of the team organizations or new pay schemes to a great extent (each variable is 
either 0 or 1 for most firms). System 2 uses contingent pay schemes to a great extent but without 
introducing team organizations to a great extent. System 3 widely adopts cross-functional 
off-line teams but not self-managed on-line teams to any great extent. Finally, System 4 adopts 
both types of teams and also uses profit sharing plans and/or pay for performance. To relate the 
results with our theoretical model, we interpret System 1 and 2 as the vertical control systems, 
System 3 as the hybrid coordination system, and System 4 as the horizontal coordination system. 
 Note that all firms in System 3 have joint labor-management committees. This result is 
consistent with our interpretation that system 3 is the hybrid coordination system. If management 
maintains a substantial level of formal authority in many decision problems but employ teams to 
improve information acquisition and adaptation capability, the firm will introduce off-line teams 
which do not require substantial changes in production procedure and training programs. In such 
organizations, JLMCs are essential mechanism that management uses to convey their mission, 
                                                 
16 Ward’ method attempts to minimize the sum of squares of any two (hypothetical) clusters that can 
be formed at each step of tree clustering algorithm. In general, this method is regarded as very efficient. 
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strategy, and long-term plans to their employees who are somewhat empowered to adjust their 
implementation in order to adapt to changing environment.  
Another noteworthy finding is that all firms in System 4 have shop-floor committees. As 
theory suggests, the horizontal coordination system should have a flat structure with least layers 
in the organization and provide teams with highest autonomy. Such organizations with highly 
self-directed teams may not necessarily require JLMCs since management has to commit to the 
empowerment strategy. Rather, the horizontal coordination system will require close and 
frequent communication among work units which may necessitate formal structure such as 
SFCs. 
The rest of the Table provides rather straightforward support for our theoretical 
explorations. First, the number of layers of organization is 6.16 on average in System 4 (the 
horizontal coordination system), the lowest among the four systems. Second, a higher percentage 
of firms in System 4 choose multi-divisional form (or M-form) rather than functional form (or 
unitary form/U-form). Third, both CFOTs and SMOTs are more autonomous in System 4 than in 
other systems except that SMOTs in System 1 are more autonomous than those in System 4.17 
Since none of System 1 firms adopt SMOTs to a great extent and only 20% of them use them 
only to a limited extent, comparing System 1 to System 4 is not very meaningful. The levels of 
organizations at which various decisions are made are also the lowest in System 4.18 As a result, 
                                                 
17 We asked the question, “How much do teams receive directions from middle managers 
(supervisors or those who evaluate the performance of teams) in deciding on the work process within the 
teams?”, and the respondents were requested to answer in the five-point Likert scale, “1: Teams rarely receive 
directions from middle managers,” “2: Teams very occasionally receive directions from middle managers,” “3: 
Teams sometimes receive directions from middle managers,” “4: Teams often receive directions from middle 
managers,” and “5: Middle managers determine the work process.” 
18 We asked “Who has the real authority over the following decision problems among (1) president, 
(2) executives, division managers, or plant managers, (3) general managers, or foreman, (4) section chief, 
group managers, line managers (5) line workers?: ① development of new businesses, ② investment and 
procurement of 5 million yen, ③ selection of suppliers for primary material, ④ price changes of primary 
products and services, ⑤ dealing with claims from buyers such as returns of defect products, ⑥ determination 
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decision making is fastest in System 4.19Other findings are: (1) System 4 firms are most likely to 
adopt differentiation strategy and, compared with System 3, less likely to adopt cost leadership 
strategy; (2) System 4 firms offer more training on average than firms in any other system. 
 
IV. Concluding remarks 
 This paper has explored theoretically and empirically a potentially important yet 
often-neglected interplay between task coordination within the organization and the structure of 
organization and HRMP bundling. In so doing, we have also provided fresh insights on linkage 
between the firm’s technological and output market characteristics and its choice of HRMP 
system, for the firm’s technological and market conditions affect how the firm coordinates 
various tasks within the organization. Furthermore, such technological and output market 
conditions also influence the firm’s decision about its hiring and training policy and its market 
strategy. In sum, we have explored complementarity among strategies, human capital, and 
organizational choices as suggested by Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002). 
 Our model built on the works by Dessein and Santos (2006) and Aoki (1986) has two 
important implications: (1) as the value of adaptation versus coordination increases, the firm is 
more likely to rely on horizontal coordination rather than vertical control and utilize teams and 
invest in horizontal communication channels; (2) as the technological and market environment 
becomes more disruptive, the firm is more likely to adopt a vertical control system and hence 
                                                                                                                                                             
of work pace and schedule in primary operations, ⑦ determination of task allocation and work methods.”  
19 We asked “How long does it normally take to make the following types of decisions: ① after 
getting proposals for new products and services until starting them as formal business projects, ② after getting 
requests for investment and procurement of 5 million yen until approving or disapproving them, ③ after 
receiving attractive offers from potential suppliers for primary material until deciding on switching suppliers, 
④ after knowing changes in price of primary inputs or price of competitors’ products until revising your own 
product prices when necessary, ⑤ after receiving the report of defect products until taking necessary measures 
such as recall and refund: choices are (1) less than one week, (2) one week or longer and less than one month, 
(3) one month or longer and less than three months, (4) three months or longer and less than six months (5) six 
months or longer.   
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develop labor-management communication channels. A rise in the value of coordination may or 
may not induce more use of teams and horizontal coordination. 
Guided by the theoretical exploration, we have conducted an empirical analysis of new 
data from Japan, which provide for the first time data on newer forms of organizational 
innovation, such as self-managed online teams and cross-functional offline teams as well as pay 
for performance in addition to data on longer-established practices including joint 
labor-management committees and shopfloor committees.  
One novel finding is that the adoption of both self-managed online teams and 
cross-functional offline teams usually arises in firms with shop-floor committees while the 
introduction of cross-functional offline teams alone often takes place in firms with 
labor-management committees. This finding is consistent with the view that: (1) organizations 
where activities or decisions are coordinated differently tend to adopt different work 
organization; and (2) communication channels such as labor-management committees and 
shop-floor committees play an important role in intra-firm coordination. 
We have also confirmed empirical patterns that are consistent with the implications from 
our theory about the relationships between market structure/environment and the adoption of 
team organizations. Specifically, firms in more competitive markets are more likely to adopt both 
types of teams while firms facing more erratic price movement tend not to adopt self-managed 
online teams.
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Table 1 Proportion of firms with each HRMP 
%firms with
CFOT SMOT PFP PSP JLMC SFC Bench-marking ＭＢＯ
Among all firms 54% 31% 53% 52% 60% 41% 15% 65%
Among all firms with CFOT *** 42% 53% 51% * 63% *** 51% 15% 67%
SMOT *** 74% * 58% 57% 57% *** 51% 14% 62%
PFP 56% * 35% *** 70% ** 64% *** 48% *** 19% *** 72%
PSP 55% 34% *** 70% * 63% * 45% * 17% *** 69%
JLMC * 58% 30% ** 56% * 55% *** 52% *** 18% *** 70%
SFC *** 68% *** 39% *** 61% * 56% *** 76% *** 20% ** 70%
Bench-
marking 58% 31% *** 69% * 62% *** 75% *** 58% *** 83%
MBO 58% 30% *** 59% *** 56% *** 65% ** 45% *** 19%  
Note: We conducted the likelihood ratio test to investigate the null hypothesis that each pair of practices is employed independently from each other.  *, ** and *** indicate that the 
null hypothesis is rejected at the significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
  
 
Table 2 List of Independent Variables 
Variables Measures Values/units 
Listed The firm is listed in one of TSE, OSE, or NSE (stock exchanges in Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya) 1 or 0 
Number of Employees Number of regular employees on a non-consolidated basis in thousands 
Overseas Sales Ratio 
Level of overseas sales ratio rated on the 5-point scale: 1 for 0%, 2 for 
more than 0% but less than 10%, 3 for 10% or more and less than 30%, 
4 for 30% or more and less than 50%, and 5 for 50% or more 
1,2,3,4,5 
Customer 
Concentration 
Share of sales to five major customers in total sales rated on the 5-point 
scale: 1 for less than 10%, 2 for 10% or more and less than 30%, 3 for 
30% or more and less than 50%, 4 for 50% or more and less than 80%, 
and 5 for 80% or more 
1,2,3.4,5 
Extent of Price 
Changes 
Typical changes of market price or prices set by major competitors for 
the firm's core products or services rated on the 5-point scale: 1 for 
within 3%, 2 for within 5%, 3 for within 10%, 4 for within 20%, 5 for 
more than 20%   
1,2,3,4,5 
College Graduates Share of employees with college or postgraduate degrees in total regular workforce % 
Training for New Hires Number of days spent in formal training for new hires days 
Layers of Organization Number of layers of organization from president to front-line workers in the firm's core business positive integers 
M-form Organization The firm is organized not by functions but by production lines, customer types, or regions  1 or 0 
Autonomy of CFOTs 
Degrees to which cross-functional offline teams receive directions from 
middle managers in deciding on the work process rated on a 5-point 
scale: 1for rarely, 2 for very occasionally, 3 for sometimes, 4 for often,  
and 5 for always. 
1,2,3,4,5 
Autonomy of SMOTs 
Degrees to which self-managed online teams receive directions from 
middle managers in deciding on the work process rated on a 5-point 
scale: 1for rarely, 2 for very occasionally, 3 for sometimes, 4 for often,  
and 5 for always. 
1,2,3,4,5 
Decision Making Speed 
Average length of time period the firm normally takes to make five 
types of decisions rated on a 5-point scale: 1 for less than one week, 2 
for one week or longer and less than one month, 3 for one month or 
longer and less than three months, 4 for three months or longer and less 
than six months, and 5 for six months or longer 
1,2,3,4,5 
Decision Making Level 
Average level of people who has the real authority over 7 decision 
problems rated on a 5-point scale: 1 for president, 2 for executives, 
division managers or plant managers, 3 for general managers or 
foreman, 4 for section chief, group managers, or line managers, and 5 
for line workers  
1,2,3,4,5 
Differentiation Strategy 
Degree to which the firm sees its strategy as classified as differentiation 
strategy rated on a 5-point scale: 1 for strongly disagree, 2 for 
disagree, 3 for somewhat agree, 4 for agree, 5 for strongly agree 
1,2,3,4,5 
Cost Leadership 
Strategy 
Degree to which the firm sees its strategy as classified as cost 
leadership strategy rated on a 5-point scale: 1 for strongly disagree, 2 
for disagree, 3 for somewhat agree, 4 for agree, 5 for strongly agree 
1,2,3,4,5 
   
  
Table3  Probit Estimates of the Incidence of Cross-functional Off-line Teams 
Dependent Variable: CFOT 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Overseas Sales Ratio 0.164** 0.188** 0.199** 0.181**
 (0.081) (0.087) (0.096) (0.089)
Customer Concentration  0.137** 0.184*** 0.145**
  (0.058) (0.064) (0.060)
Range of Price Changes  -0.088 0.027 -0.118
  (0.085) (0.095) (0.087)
JLMCs -0.145 -0.068 0.049 -0.024
 (0.161) (0.178) (0.196) (0.181)
SFCs 0.569*** 0.612*** 0.623*** 0.632***
 (0.156) (0.171) (0.191) (0.178)
College Graduates  0.005
  (0.004)
Training for New Hires  0.000
  (0.004)
Benchmarking  -0.099
  (0.091)
MBO  0.062
  (0.082)
Listed -0.028 -0.027 -0.070 -0.026 
 (0.187) (0.205) (0.248) (0.206)
Number of Employees 0.002 -0.002 0.027 0.000
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.032) (0.023)
Firm Age 0.005 0.008 0.006 0.009
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prob > chi2 0.0006 0.0039 0.0026 0.0078
Pseudo R-squared 0.0758 0.0932 0.1163 0.0991
# of Observations 332 284 234 279
Notes: 
Robust standard errors are in the parentheses.  
*, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 
  
 
Table 4  Probit Estimates of the Incidence of Self-managed On-line Teams 
Dependent Variable: SMOT 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Overseas sales Ratio 0.092 0.070 0.153* 0.088
 (0.076) (0.080) (0.090) (0.083)
Customer Concentration  0.016 0.045 0.019
  (0.061) (0.066) (0.064)
Range of Price Changes  -0.183** -0.090 -0.178**
  (0.086) (0.098) (0.089)
JLMCs -0.404** -0.399** -0.484** -0.401**
 (0.170) (0.189) (0.212) (0.193)
SFCs 0.373** 0.452*** 0.326* 0.402**
 (0.162) (0.173) (0.196) (0.182)
College Graduates  0.006
  (0.004)
Training for New Hires  0.006*
  (0.003)
Benchmarking  -0.030
  (0.092)
MBO  -0.077
  (0.089)
Listed -0.392* -0.337 -0.378 -0.307 
 (0.207) (0.216) (0.264) (0.220)
Number of Employees 0.041** 0.030 0.020 0.036
 (0.020) (0.021) (0.037) (0.022)
Firm Age -0.004 -0.002 -0.005 0.000
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prob > chi2 0.0015 0.0083 0.1458 0.0253
Pseudo R-squared 0.081 0.0825 0.0851 0.0847
# of Observations 327 280 224 275
Notes: 
Robust standard errors are in the parentheses.  
*, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
  
 
Table 5  Probit Estimates of the Incidence of Pay for Performance
Dependent Variable: PFP 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Overseas sales Ratio 0.034 0.046 0.101 -0.007
 (0.078) (0.083) (0.092) (0.085)
Customer Concentration  -0.082 -0.100 -0.079
  (0.060) (0.065) (0.061)
Range of Price Changes  0.002 -0.004 0.015
  (0.082) (0.093) (0.086)
JLMCs 0.101 0.204 0.132 0.186
 (0.169) (0.187) (0.205) (0.191)
SFCs 0.323** 0.376** 0.236 0.271
 (0.158) (0.171) (0.190) (0.179)
College Graduates  0.000
  (0.004)
Training for New Hires  0.006
  (0.003)
Benchmarking  0.110
  (0.091)
MBO  0.229***
  (0.085)
Listed -0.216 -0.308 -0.461* -0.263 
 (0.209) (0.221) (0.262) (0.224)
Number of Employees 0.224*** 0.194** 0.239*** 0.145**
 (0.085) (0.077) (0.087) (0.075)
Firm Age -0.002 -0.004 -0.006 -0.007
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prob > chi2 0.0067 0.0066 0.02 0.0006
Pseudo R-squared 0.0757 0.0916 0.0962 0.1200
# of Observations 328 281 232 276
Notes: 
Robust standard errors are in the parentheses.  
*, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
  
  
 
Table 6  Probit Estimates of the Incidence of Profit Sharing Plans
Dependent Variable: PSP 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Overseas sales Ratio 0.136* 0.097 0.140 0.063
 (0.075) (0.079) (0.089) (0.081)
Customer Concentration  -0.025 0.001 -0.034
  (0.058) (0.064) (0.059)
Range of Price Changes  -0.051 0.042 -0.029
  (0.082) (0.092) (0.085)
JLMCs 0.051 0.033 -0.046 0.020
 (0.162) (0.180) (0.200) (0.184)
SFCs 0.156 0.161 0.043 0.053
 (0.153) (0.165) (0.186) (0.173)
College Graduates  0.002
  (0.004)
Training for New Hires  0.000
  (0.003)
Benchmarking  0.184**
  (0.087)
MBO  0.052
  (0.082)
Listed 0.068 -0.043 -0.168 -0.062 
 (0.181) (0.196) (0.235) (0.199)
Number of Employees 0.010 -0.017 0.018 0.032
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.037) (0.021)
Firm Age 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.006
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prob > chi2 0.0732 0.1767 0.4713 0.0933
Pseudo R-squared 0.0474 0.0501 0.0529 0.0633
# of Observations 331 283 234 278
Notes: 
Robust standard errors are in the parentheses.  
*, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 7 Systems of HRM Practices 
 
Clusters
# of observations
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Participation in CFOTs 
(5 pt scale bet. 0 & 4) 0.49 0.63 0.40 0.53 3.29 0.85 1.73 1.57
Participation in SMOTs 
(5 pt scale bet. 0 & 4) 0.21 0.48 0.19 0.45 0.14 0.35 3.35 0.85
Participation in PSPs    
(5 pt scale bet. 0 & 4) 0.20 0.58 3.86 0.37 1.64 1.85 2.29 1.87
Participation in PFP      
(5 pt scale bet. 0 & 4) 0.96 1.53 2.76 1.79 1.49 1.79 2.44 1.83
Listed 0.21 0.41 0.26 0.44 0.27 0.45 0.13 0.34
Number of Employees 728.6 1550.5 915.6 1770.2 1963.5 5625.4 1383.6 5963.5
JLMCs 0.42 0.50 0.39 0.49 1.00 0.00 0.68 0.47
SFCs 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.39 0.14 0.35 1.00 0.00
Layers of Organization 6.43 1.35 6.35 1.62 6.29 1.84 6.16 1.71
M-form Organization 
(yes: 1, no: 0) 0.36 0.48 0.32 0.47 0.36 0.49 0.43 0.50
Autonomy of CFOTs     
(5 pt scale bet. 1 & 5) 2.49 1.05 2.67 1.22 2.56 0.86 2.74 0.94
Autonomy of SMOTs     
(5 pt scale bet. 1 & 5) 2.88 1.05 2.39 0.92 2.14 1.07 2.44 0.80
Decision Making Speed 
(1:fast-5:slow) 2.57 0.70 2.50 0.74 2.60 0.66 2.36 0.58
Decision Making Level 
(1:low-5:high) 2.55 0.55 2.58 0.53 2.62 0.49 2.50 0.60
Differentiation Strategy 
(1: absolutely not, 7: 
absolutely yes)
3.20 1.06 3.47 0.91 3.32 1.09 3.53 0.88
Cost Leadership 
Strategy (1: absolutely 
not, 7: absolutely yes)
3.01 0.91 3.18 0.87 3.46 0.91 3.22 0.86
Days of Formal Training 
for New Employess 20.3 27.7 18.2 23.5 20.0 37.2 27.7 30.4
Little use of teams 
and incentive pay
Wide use of 
incentive pay 
without teams
Wide use of cross-
functional offline 
teams
Wide use of all kinds 
of teams and 
incentive pay
149 101 55 63
System 1 System 2 System 3 System 4
  
  
Figure 1. Relative Efficiency among Three Organizations: the Effect of Adaptation Loss 
Parameter α 
 
Figure 2. Relative Efficiency among Three Organizations: the Effect of Adaptation Loss 
Parameter β  
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Proof of Proposition 1:  
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α σ φ τ∂ Π ≥∂ ∂ , the result is immediate from the comparative statics analysis of 
supermodular functions. The last inequality, however, does not hold in general. In order to apply 
the theory of supermodular optimization to this case, we define 
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p t t p= Π , the optimal communication quality given the degree of task bundling 
in teams t.  From assumption 2, *( )p t  is uniquely determined and the highest optimal value of 
pˆ  is always equal to *( )p t .  Therefore, from the theory of supermodular optimization, in order 
to obtain the monotone comparative statics result, it suffices to show that  
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and *( , ( ))t p t
p
∂Π
∂ > 0. By assumption 2, the strict inequality of ( , )t pΠ , 
* *( ) ( )p t p t> .   
We prove the inequality (1.1) in the following three cases: 
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The last inequality is from *ˆ ( )p p t> .  This concludes the proof. ∎ 
Proof of Proposition 2: The right-hand side of the inequality(1.8), the adaptation and 
coordination losses for the horizontal coordination system, approaches to 
2
,
min ( )(1 ) ( ) ( , , )
t p
n t p h t p dβ σ φ τ− − + +  as α increases to the infinity. Since the left-hand side of 
the inequality is an increasing linear function of α, the latter always eventually exceeds the 
former. Let αˆ  be the greatest intersection of the cost functions of the two systems.∎ 
Proof of Proposition 3: The right-hand side of the inequality(1.8), the adaptation and 
coordination losses for the horizontal coordination system, approaches to d as β decreases to zero, 
while the left-hand side of the inequality is a linear function of β and is 2 2( ( ) )vα σ η σ+ for β = 0.  
If 2 2( ( ) )vd α σ η σ< + , the horizontal coordination system always becomes more efficient for 
sufficiently small β.  Let βˆ  be the lowest intersection of the cost functions of the two systems. 
Proof of Proposition 5: When **t = 1 and **p = 0 are substituted in, the expression (1.9) 
becomes smaller than the adaptation and coordination losses in the vertical control system. 
Proof of Proposition 6: Since raising t and p has a smaller impact on 
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n t p
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α σ ηα β
− −
+ − −  than 
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/ ( )(1 )
n t p
n t p
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− −
+ − − , the result is immediate.∎ 
